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THE EFFECT OF MERGER OR CONSOLIDATION ON
THE SUCCESSION OF CORPORATE FIDUCIARIES
By EDWARD J. FRUCnTiAN*
I. THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED
The comparatively recent trend toward trust-mindedness,1
the more frequent use of the corporate body as trustee or fiduci-
ary2 for other purposes, the expansion of banking business,3 and
the tendency toward the "centralization of corporate interests' "4
have combined to create the situations involving the problems to
be considered here. The questions to be dealt with specifically
relate to the succession of fiduciary relationships, and appoint-
ments tllereto, after a consolidation or merger of banks and trust
companies, at least one of which, has been named as trustee, exec-
utor, or administrator. Objection may be raised that discus-
sion of the succession problem must be purely academic, in view
of the fact that the corporation succeeding after the consolida-
tion or merger has title to the property in question, and conse-
quently will act as trustee, executor or administrator, as the
case may be, without interference from any of the parties con-
cerned. It is believed however, that to follow a policy of "let-
ting a sleeping dog lie" does not lead to beneficial results, but
must involve time and money wasting litigation.5
It may be well to note at the outset what limitations and
exclusions will be followed here. No attempt will be made to
* Edward J. Fruchtman, A. B., Columbia 1932; LL. B., Columbia
University School of Law 1934.
Powell: Cases & Materials on Trusts & Estates. 41-5.
2 Bogert: Trusts & Some Recent Developments, 23 Ill. L. R. 749.
3 Levit: Trust Powers of National Banks. 77, U. of Pa. L. R. 835.
4 Supra, note 2.
5 Supra, note 2. "It is true that in the case of many trusteeship&
this practical construction in favor of succession may succeed in avoid-
ing all trouble," but "Some beneficiary is sure to object sooner or later
and demand the appointment of a new trustee or object to the pay-
ment of compensation to the corporate trustee on the ground that it
is merely a trustee de son tort. And, furthermore, third parties are
sure to raise the question of the validity of the acts of the new cor-
poration as trustee, as in the case of sales of land by the company as-
suming to act as a successor trustee. The risks of litigation and loss
of time and money are too great to allow these questions of succession
to be passed over as merely theoretical."
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delve into the questions posed by the converting or reorganiza-
tion of a state bank named as fiduciary into a national bank.
Generally, such a change is not considered a transmogrification
or extinguishment of the corporate identity of the state bank,
and consequently the reorganized institution succeeds as fiduci-
ary, whether the state bank was already acting as fiduciary or
merely had been designated as successor in the will of a living
person.0 Nor will consideration be taken of the situations in
which, the creator of the fiduciary relationship has expressly pro-
vided for the contingencies of consolidation and/or merger.
They present little or no problem. The ability of national banks
to act as fiduciaries 7 is assumed, as is the constitutionality of the
statutes hereinafter mentioned.
Later confusion may best be avoided by defining consolida-
tion and merger at this point. The distinction between them is
vital in some of the fact situations in which the question of suc-
cession may arise, although such might not be the impression
gained by the haphazard way in which some judges and legis-
]ators sport with them. Briefly, consolidation involves the union
of two or more constituent corporations, resulting in the crea-
tion of a new corporate entity and the determination of the lives
of the participating institutions.8 Merger "is absorption of one
corporation by a second corporation. Its theory is that the
merged corporation loses its corporate existence and its property
interests pass to the corporation into which the merged corpora-
tion has become absorbed. The second corporation, which does
the absorbing, continues in existence with afl its former powers
and rights" (italics ours)9 In view of this striking difference
it is rather startling to find the courts speaking of consolidation
when they mean merger'0 and vice versa.
6 Supra, note 2, also stating that the only operative change is that
the reorganized institution is now subject to control by federal rather
than state law.
IThe privilege of exercising fiduciary powers has been open to
national banks since 1913. 38 Stat. 251 11 (k).
8 31 Columbia Law Review 732. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Zinser,
264 Ill. 31, 35; 105 N. E. 718 (1914).
9 upra, note 2. Consolidation & Merger: 6 New York University
Law Review 404, stating that "a new corporation results always from
a consolidation, never from a merger."
Worcester County Arational Bank, Petitioner, 263 Mass. 444, 162
N. E. 217 (1928) affd. 279 U. S. 347, 49 S. Ct. 368 (1929). Infra note
33.
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IL PRESENT STATE OF THE LAV ACCORDING TO DECISIONS IN
JURISDICTIONS WHERE THERE ARE No STATUTES SPECIFICALLY
DEALING WITH THE PROBLEm OF SUCCESSION
The variety of fact situations in which problems of suc-
cession may arise is so great 1 that the paucity of decided cases
nThe possible variations in which the problem of succession may
arise where only a single union (consolidation or merger) has oc-
curred:
1. Testamentary Trustees:
A. Where State Bank A merges into State Bank B.
1. And A has already been designated trustee, but testator
hasn't yet died.
2. And A is already acting as trustee when the merger
occurs.
3. And A is designated trustee after the merger has occurred.
Problem: Does B succeed as trustee?
4. And B has already been designated trustee, but testator
hasn't yet died.
5. And B is already acting as trustee when merger occurs.
6. And B is designated trustee after the merger has occurred.
Problem: Does B continua as trustee?
N. B.-In the remaining portions of this footnote, the language
of I-A-i, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 will be omitted, but will be designated by et cetera."
B. Where State Banks A & B Consolidate to Form State Bank C:
1. And A etc. 2. And A etc. 3. And A etc.
Problem: Does C succeed as trustee?
4. And B etc. 5. And B etc. 6. And B etc.
Problem: Does C succeed as trustee?
C. State Bank A Merges into National Bank C:
1. And A etc. 2. And A etc. 3. And A etc.
Problem: Does C succeed as trustee?
4. And C etc. 5. And C etc. 6. And C etc.
Problem: Does C continue as trustee?
D. State Bank A Consolidates with National Bank C to Form
National Bank D:
1. And A etc. 2. And A etc. 3. And A etc.
Problem: Does D succeed as trustee?
4. And C etc. 5. And C etc. 6. And C etc.
Problem: Does D succeed as trustee?
E. National Banks C & D Consolidate to Form National Bank E:
1. And C etc. 2. And C etc. 3. And C etc.
Problem: Does D succeed as trustee?
4. And D etc. 5. And D etc. 6. And D etc.
Problem: Does E succeed as trustee?
F. National Bank C Merges into National Bank D:
1. And C etc. 2. And C etc. 3. And C etc.
Problem: Does D succeed as trustee?
4. And D etc. 5. And D etc. 6. And D etc.
Problem: Does D continue as trustee?
II. Inter Vivos Trustees:
A. Where State Bank A merges into State Bank B.
B. Where State Banks A & B consolidate to form State Bank C.
C. Where State Bank A merges into National Bank C.
D. Where State Bank A consolidates with National Bank C to
form National Bank D.
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in this category is noticeable. The first New York case was a
lower court decision in which it was held that the merger of a
state organization, named as executor, into another state or-
ganization during the lifetime of the testator precluded the ab-
sorbing corporation from succeeding as executor.' 2 The reason-
ing of the court shows that the decision was written with an eye
E. Where National Banks C & D consolidate to form National
Bank E.
F. Where National Bank C merges into National Bank D.
All those fact situations under variationq I-A, B, C, D, & F are
also present under variations II-A, B, C, D, E & F (i. e. Where inter-
vivos trusts rather than testamentary trusts have been created, loth
one exception, viz.: fact situation No. 1-Explicitly, fact situation
No. 1 under I-A, B, C, D, E & F occurs when the particular bank in
question has already been designated trustee, but the testator hasn't
yet died at the time of the consolidation or merger. Clearly, this situa-
tion cannot arise where an inter vivo& trust has been created, for the
trust begins at once on the execution of the instrument.
III. Executors:
A. Where state bank A merges into state bank B.
B. Where state banks A & B consolidate to form state bank C.
C. Where state bank merges into national bank C.
D. Where state bank A consolidates with national bank C, to
form national bank D.
E. Where national banks C & D consolidate to form national bank
E.
F. Where national bank C merges into national bank D.
In this class (III) the possible fact situations under variations
A, B, C, D, E & F, are identical with the fact situations in class I-i. e.,
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 are to be considered as all coming under each
variation A, B, C, D, E, F.
IV. Administrators:
A. Where state bank A merges into state bank B.
B. Where state banks A & B consolidate to form state bank C.
C. Where state bank A merges into national bank C.
D. Where state bank A consolidates with national bank C to form
national bank D.
E. Where national banks C & D consolidate to form national
bank B.
F. Where national bank C merges into national bank D.
All those fact suituations under variations of class IV are also
present under variations of class I, with one exception, viz.: fact
situation No. 1. In fact situation No. 1 under class I variations occur
when the will making the designation is still ambulatory. Such a sit-
uation cannot obtain in class IV, for the designation as administrator
doesn't take effect until after the intestate's death.
It will be observed that the above analysis applies only when there
has been a single consolidation or merger. The situation may be made
more complex by interspersing reorganizations and further consolida-
tions or mergers.
"Matter of Stikeman, 48 Misc. 156; 96 N. Y. S. 460 (1905): Testa-
tor named the A Trust Co. as executor. Thereafter, and during testa-
tor's life, the A Trust Co. was merged into the B Trust Co. which seeks
to act as executor. HelZ: B Co. does not succeed to the executorship.
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to the actual financial make-up of the absorbing corporation.
The trust company originally designated was purely a banking
institution with specific power to act as executor while the
absorbing company was the Title Guarantee & Trust Co., organ-
ized under special legislative act in which no specific menition of
power to act as executor was made. In refusing to allow the suc-
cession the court took notice of the fact that the absorbing com-
pany had greater liabilities and obligations because of its busi-
ness of guaranteeing mortgages and titles to real estate. It is
interesting to note that the court, in passing, disposed of two
arguments12A that were later to be relied on by the same and dif-
ferent courts in reaching an opposite conclusion.
Seven years later the New York Court of Appeals reached a
contrary result on an almost identical state of facts' 3 with the
added variant of a statute,14 -which, however, in terms made no
mention of the right to succeed as fiduciary. The reasoning of
the court was to the effect that inasmuch as the right to make a
2AMatter of Stikeman, supra, note 12: "There was no vested or
inchoate right obtained by (A Trust Co., Ed.) by reason of its having
been named as executor of the will; this right to administer became
vested or inchoate only upon the death of the testator and at that
time the corporation named was not in existence, . . . the petition
must be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner is a stranger to
the will and its probate."
"The will was made before there was any suggestion of merger
between the two companies, and, therefore, it could not have been in
contemplation of the will maker at the time of the execution of his
testamentary instrument. It is argued that all that the law permitted
a corporation to do must be presumed to be in the mind of the trust-
maker, but this, I think, would be straining the rule as to presumption
beyond its legitimate purpose. We are to gather, if we can, the inten-
tion of the testator."
"In the natter of Bergdorf, 206 N. Y. 309; 99 N. E. 714 (1912).
Testator named A Trust Co. as an executor, later, but while testator
was yet alive, the A Trust Co. was merged into the B Trust Co. which,
on the subsequent death of testator, petitioned for letters testamenary
as executor. The court allowed the petition on the ground that the
designation as executor was a "privilege or interest" under the exist-
ing statute (infra n. 14) which by the merger was transferred to the
B Trust Co.
I New York Banking Laws 39 (Consol. Laws), 1909, c. 2, 839.
"Effect of Merger.-Upon the merger of any corporation in the
manner herein provided all and singular the rights, franchises and in-
terests of the said corporation so merged in and to every species of
property, real, personal and mixed, and things in action thereunto be-
longing shall be deemed to be transferred to and vested in such cor-
poration into which it has been merged, without any other deed or
transfer and said last named corporation shall hold and enjoy the
same and all rights of property."
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testamentary disposition depended on statutory permission, the
legislature could make its exercise subject to such regulations as
it might please. Ergo a testator must be deemed to have in-
tended the results which the operation of those regulations pro-
duces.15 After this slightly strong-arm method of dragging
in the statute, the only link in the chain of reasoning necessary
to be forged was that the designation of the A Trust Company
as executor was an "interest" within the meaning of the Statute
and therefore was transferrable to the absorbing institution. The
court hesitated not an instant.
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Zinser'6 dealt with a similar
set of fact but involved a consolidation rather than a merger,
but in reaching the same result, a somewhat different approach
was employed. After asserting that the testatrix was presumed
to intend 17 the future consolidation of her original executor with
other banks, the court did not consider, as was done in Matter
of Bergdorf, whether the mere designation as executor was a
sufficient interest or property right to be transferred to the
successor bank. It impliedly assumed that it was. The main
problem was whether the designation as executor, usually indi-
cating a close personal relation, could be delegated. It was held
that the "personal relation" rule had no applicability in the case
of corporations.' s
15In the matter of Bergdorf, supra, n. 13. "They affect the testa-
mentary dispositions . . . as tho embodied in the will" . . .
"In reading the sections, we do not regard the intention of the testator
but that of the legislature."
"264 Ill. 31; 105 N. E. 718; Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 931 (1914). In an
action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land
brought by C Trust Co., D defended on the ground that P didn't have
authority to sell. P Trust Company was the result of a consolidation
of state organizations A & B during life of the testatrix, who had desig-
nated Trust Co. A as executor in her will. The court held that the P
corporation succeeded as executor and was therefore entitled to specific
performance.
11 "She (testatrix: Ed.) therefore contemplated that these changes
(Consolidation: Ed.) might occur and that the Real Estate Title and
Trust Co. might be consolidated with some other corporation such as
the Chicago Title and Trust Co. and that it would thereby cease to
exist and become a component part of a new corporation."
8"That general rule (non-delegability by the .named executor of
non-ministerial powers: Ed.) rests upon the ground that the selection
of a trustee implies personal confidence in his discretion and judgment.
. The rule, however, cannot be applied to the case of a corpora-
tion, because the element of trust in the judgment and discretion of an
individual is entirely wanting. A corporation is without personality,
and if it is selected as trustee or executor, there can be no reliance
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It is believed that the theories of the two courts are open to
some criticism, both on strictly legalistic and practical consid-
erations. It seems too much to say that the mere designation as
executor in a will is a property right while the testator is yet
living. To hold the contrary would appear to be an a fortiori
conclusion from the accepted view of the interest of a devisee or
legatee before the testator has died, for in the case of a devisee
a clear pecuniary gain, usually unearned in the sense that it is
not a return for rendered services, will result on his surviving
the testator. During the latter's life, the devisee has merely an
expectancy which will lapse, in the absence of statute, on his
predeceasing him, the testator.19 The one named as executor
has, while the testator is yet alive, a less desirable interest than
the expectant devisee, at least from the pecuniary point of view.
What he will receive, on the death of the testator, will be, not a
windfall, but merely a right to compensation for services to be
rendered. This no doubt is valuable, 20 but not, it is thought,
to as great an extent as the devisee's interest. Similarly, there-
fore, the expectancy of becoming an executor should lapse on
the death (by consolidation or merger) of the person (corpora-
tion) designated as such. Viewed, therefore, in a strictly logical
light the decision of In the Matter of Bergdorf2 l is unjustifiable.
'Whether the result is a desirable one in the light of common
practice and the interests of the parties involved will be con-
sidered later.
The Illinois Court has too fully disregarded the factors that
influence an individual in choosing his executors or trustees.
Starting from the wooden premise that a corporation has no
"personality" it is an easy step to the conclusion that no confi-
dence can be reposed in such a body. Factually, it is believed,
such is not even usually the case. Particular banks are chosen
because of reputations for conservatism, because the testator
may be the brotier-in-law of the third vice-president, because of
confidence in the current personnel, because the bank may once
have extended business aid to the testator or for a variety of
upon individual discretion or even upon the continuance of the same
administration."
See Kehl v. Taylor, 275 Ill. 346, 114 N. E. 125 (1916).
21 Since 1929, the mere opportunity of working has taken on the
aspect of a boon from the gods.
2 Supra, note 13.
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other reasons. The change of legal exterior, by merger or con-
solidation may or may not carry with it more significant
changes. 22 The failure to investigate such possibilities may lead
to foisting on the estate an executor of whom the testator might
never have thought, or have purposely refrained from appoint-
ing at the time of executing the will. There is no indication
either way in the decision, but the fact that nothing untoward
happens in a specific instance does not serve to excuse a faulty,
too-artificial technique.
The Massachusetts Courts have evinced an attitude at the
other extreme, although, the cases can be differentiated factually.
Comnmonwealth-Atlantic National Bank of Boston, Petitioner23
and Atlantic National Bank, Petitioner24 involved reorganiza-
tions coupled with consolidations and in each it was held that
the evolving national bank did not succeed as executor and trus-
tee respectively. In Atlantic National Bank, Petitioner, the
court refused to be guided by a dictum in a case 25 decided three
years previously, sanctioning such succession. The first of the
trio refused to allow the succession on two grounds: (1) That
the mere designation as executor in an ambulatory will was not
a thing which passed as property, or as an asset to the evolving
2E. g. (1) Change of personnel, (2) change of policies, (3) in-
creased liabilities, (4) depreciation of stock.
21249 Mass. 440; 144 N. E. 443 (1924). State bank A was converted
into national bank B, which consolidated with National bank _C during
life of testator to form national bank D. D, on testator's subsequent
death, petitioned to act as executor as successor to state bank A, which
testator had originally named executor. The Court held the executor-
ship was vacant and didn't pass to national bank D.
-'261 Mass. 217; 158 N. E. 980 (1927). Trust Co. A was appointed
trustee in testator's will. After testator died A was converted into
national bank B, which consolidated with national bank C to form
national bank D. Held: Bank D doesn't succeed as trustee.
N. B.-Both the reorganization and consolidation occurred after
the death of testator.
:5Iowa Light, Heat and Power Co. v. First National Bank, 250 Mass.
353; 145 N. E. 433 (1924). By inter vivos trust, plaintiff conveyed
property to trust company A as trustee, reserving right to replace any
of the trust property "that may be no longer used or useful" by other
property.-Trust Co. A (state organization) consolidated with defend-
ant national bank. P seeks to replace some of the trust property with
other property and D refuses to act. P sues to compel D to release the
property from the trust mortgage. Held: Since the property sought
to be replaced is still being used, P hasn't complied with the terms of
the trust. Dictum: The D bank "has succeeded to all the rights, powers
and title of" the A trust Co., and was "trustee for the bondholders."
K. L.-4
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bank.; (2) that the distinctions 2 between a trust company or-
ganized under Massachusetts law and a national bank organized
under acts of Congress with respect to being an executor were
too fundamental to say that the entities were the same. Clearly,
however, the first ground of decision in the Commonwealth-
Atlantic National Bank of Boston, Petitioner27 cannot28 jnJsti-
fably be employed to support the result of Atlantic National
Bank, Petitioner,2 9 because in the latter case, the reorganization
and consolidation occurred after testator's death, i. e. after the
trusteeship had vested. The case may more safely rely on the
second reason, if at all .
III. PRESENT STATE OF THE LAw BY DECISIONS WHERE
STATUTE IS INVOLVED
A. The McFadden Act.
In 192730 Congress passed a statute designed to obviate most
of the difficulties latent in the succession problem, but the rare
genius of the courts to take sides has evidenced itself, in the
2 Some of the differences enumerated by the court:
1) Under Mass. law, a fiduciary must be appointed by the pro-
bate court-not so under Federal law.
2) A national bank is not governed by Mass. law as to its cor-
porate functions, duties and responsibilities-a state bank Is.
3) A national bank is not subject to same laws in respect to
supervision as a state bank is.
4) The respective banks, in short, "are controlled by different
laws."
2 Supra, note 23.
2 Although the court expressly said that the trust company had
no such property interest in its appointments as trustee as passed to
the national bank as its successor. This seems unsound.
1,Supra, note 24.
1 "The McFadden Act": 44 Stat. 1224, 1 (1927), 12 U. S. C. 34a,
12 U. S. C. A. 34a. After providing for the consolidation of state in-
stitutions with national banks: "all the rights, franchises and in-
terests of such state or district bank as consolidated with a national
banking association, in and to every species of property, real, personal
and mixed, and choses in action thereto belonging, shall be deemed
to be transferred to and vested in such national banking association
into which it is consolidated without any deed or other transfer, and
the said consolidated national banking association shall hold and
enjoy the same and all rights of property, franchises and interests,
including the right of succession as trustee, executor or in any other
11duciary capacity in the same manner and to same extent as was held
and enjoyed by such state or district bank so consolidated with such
national banking association . . . No such consolidation shal be
in contravention of the law of the State under which suck bank is in.
corporated."
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face of apparently clear language, supplemented by an opinion
by the Comptroller of the Currency.31 In Worcester County
National Bank, Petitioner,3 2 the absorbing national bank in a
merger was allowed to continue as administrator, to which posi-
tion it had been appointed before the merger. The court ex-
pressly refused to discuss the application of the McFadden Act.
But in a case33 decided the same year, under a different state of
facts, the McFadden Act was held unconstitutional. The court's
conclusion as to the Act's unconstitutionality was a non
sequitur,34 and on appeal,35 the United States Supreme Court
rejected the Massachusetts courts' view in that respect, though
the opinion -was affirmed as to the rest. Taking its cue from the
Supreme Court decision, the Georgia court reached a similar
SHe expressed his opinion to be that, on the consolidation of a
state trust company with a national bank, the latter succeeded as
trustee not only to the trusts actually being administered by the trust
company at the time of the consolidation but also to appointments
under wills designating the trust company as fiduciary, even though
such wills had not been admitted to probate until after the consolida-
tion. Letter of Comptroller of Currency, March 22, 1927. Fourteenth
Annual rep. Fed. Res. Board, 267-271.
-263 Mass. 394; 161 N. E. 797 (192S).
National bank was appointed administrator of decedent; the X
bank absorbed Y state bank in a merger occurring subsequent to the
appointment. Held: X national bank continued to act as administrator.
It will be noticed that no question of succession is here raised. The
problem Is simply whether a bank may continue to act as fiduciary
after a combination with another bank which, by definition (supra,
note 2-3), has not destroyed or changed its legal existence and char-
acter-Factually, however, the merger may have resulted in an all-
important change, e. g., increase of liabilities, change of personnel
et cetera. Legalistically, the decision is sound. Query: whether such
legalistic technic is necessarily always so from a pragmatic point of
view.
Worcester County National Bank, Petitioner, 263 Mass. 444; 162
N. E. 217 (1928). State bank A was appointed executor by the court
after decedent's death. In a merger, Bank A was absorbed by national
bank B. Held: The absorbing bank didn't succeed as executor, not-
withstanding the McFadden Act.
" The court reasoned that since the appointment of an executor(in Mass.) is a judicial function, a statute providing for the automatic
succession as fiduciary, without court's intervention, was a usurpa-
tion of such function and contrary to Mass. law and therefore was un-
constitutional.
" Ex Varte Worcester County National Bank, 279 U. S. 347, 49
S. Ct. 368, 73 L. Ed. 733 (1929). The Supreme Court affirmed on the
ground that the McFadden Act was intended to apply only when not
In contravention of state law and therefore was inapplicable in Mass.
But the mere fact of its inapplicability didn't render it unconstitu-
tional.
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result in Stevens v. First National Bank & Co.,36 a case on all
fours with the last Massachusetts case.3t It will be noticed that
though the McFadden Act uses the word "consolidation" ex-
clusively, it has been made applicable to cases of merger too.38
A rather interesting construction of the Act of 1927 was
made by an acrobatic southern court with a flair for the syllo-
gism. In Hofheimer, Exr. v. Seaboard Citizens National
Bank,39 the testator appointed state bank X as a co-executor.
During testator's life, bank X consolidated with National banlk
Y, the defendant bank emerging. After testator's death, D
claimed the right to act as co-executor with P. The court held
that succession under the McFadden Act was impossible. Under
the Act the emerging bank was to hold the "right of succession
as trustee . . . to the same extent as was held and enjoyed
by such state bank." At the time of the consolidation, however,
the state bank "held and enjoyed" nothing, for at the moment,
the state bank was not yet an executor nor was the mere desig-
nation as fiduciary in an ambulatory will a property right which
might pass to the successor corporation. The logic is unassail-
able, but the approach, as in all the preceding cases, is an arti-
ficial, purely mechanical and formalistic technique. Whether
such a technique always reaches the most desirable results, prag-
matically, i. e., from the standpoint of the interested parties
other than the fiduciary, is questionable. This point will be con-
sidered later.
That the McFadden Act is not restricted in its application
to creating instruments of a testamentary nature is evidenced by
First National Bank v. Chapmnan,40 allowing the bank emerging
"173 Ga. 332; 160 S. E. 243 (1931). State bank X was appointed
administrator by the ordinary, as required by Ga. law. Before making
its final return after fully administering the estate, bank X was
merged into national Bank Y, changing its name to national bank Z.
Bank Z tendered the final return, which the ordinary returned on the
ground that bank Z wasn't the administrator. Held: Order granting
bank Z a mandamus requiring the ordinary to receive the return re-
versed. . . . The McFadden Act, authorizing automatic succession,
is in contravention to Ga. law, which requires an administrator to be
appointed by an ordinary, and therefore, by its very terms (supra,
n. 30-last sentence) doesn't apply.
3Supra, note 33.
1Supra, note 33, 36.
"154 Va. 392, 153 S. E. 656, affd. in 154 Va. 896, 156 S. E. 581
(1931); 160 Tenn. 72, 22 S. W. (2nd) 245 (1929).
41106 Tex. 322, 164 S. W. 900 (1914). One Smith conveyed to state
bank X, as trustee, some realty to secure payment of notes in favor
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from a "consolidation" to succeed to the trustee-ship created by
an inter vivos trust. It is believed that the court is sound in its
contention that a trustee-ship, at least in the case of banks and
trust companies, is a valuable property right. Since such insti-
tutions have been empowered to act as fiduciaries, a material por-
tion of their business is of this nature, and much of their income
is derived from such sources.
B. Other Statutes.
The cases in this group have travelled the same orthodox
road outlined above and with one exception, shed no other in-
teresting light on the problem.
Mueller v. First National Bank of Atanta41 allowed the
succession under a statute42 providing that the "consolidated
national bank shall enjoy all rights of property, franchises and
interests to same extent as was enjoyed by the national bank so
consolidated therewith"-California, under a more comprehen-
sive enactment has allowed the succession uniformly, whether the
trust be testamentary 43 or inter vivos.4 4
of D. Trustee was authorized, on default, to sell the land for the satis-
faction of the secured indebtedness. Bank X then "consolidated" with
P national bank under the McFadden Act. On Smith's subsequently
defaulting, P seeks to sell according to terms of the trust deed, claim-
ing to have succeeded as trustee. Held: P bank succeeded as trustee.
41171 Ga. 845, 156 S. E. 662 (1931). X & Y national banks con-
solidated to form Z national bank. The consolidation occurred be-
tween date of making the will and date of death of testator. Held: The
right to act as executor, being an interest in property, passes to the
successor bank, although the consolidation occurs while the will is still
ambulatory.
42 1918, c. 209, 21, 40 Stat. 1044.
13In re Barnett's Estate, 58 Cal. App. Dec. 671; 275 P. 453 (1929).
Testator named state bank A trustee. Bank A sold its business
to bank B, which in turn sold its business, including the trust de-
partment, to bank C. Bank C was converted into national bank D. The
beneficiaries objected to the filing of the report of the trust of testator
by bank D. Held: Bank D was the successor trustee and could render
the report.
"Mercantile Trust Co. v. San Joaquin Agricultural Corp., 265 P.
583 (1928). D appointed X trust company as trustee and delivered
to it a mortage. X trust company consolidated with Y trust com-
pany (both were state organizations), P was the evolving trust
company, D defaulted on the interest payments on the mortgage and
P sued to foreclose on the ground that it was the successor trustee.
Held: P succeeded as trustee under a statute providing that the new
corporation must be deemed to have succeeded to all the trusts of the
constituent corporations and to be entitled to enforce the same as fully
as its constituents might have done had no consolidation taken place.
Cf. Matter of Estate of Barreiro, 70 Cal. App. Dec. 984 (July 29,
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A recent New York case45 involved a somewhat peculiar set
of facts, apart from the number of combinations involved. Tes-
tator executed a will in 1931, naming bank A as trustee. In
1928 bank A was merged into Bank B. In 1929 bank B sur-
rendered its charter and was succeeded by bank C. Later in
1929 bank C was merged into trust company D, which in 1930
consolidated with bank E. It will thus be noticed that all these
mergers, surrenders and consolidations occurred, not only prior
to the probate of the will, but also prior to its execution and the
designation of bank A therein. Bank E's contention that testa-
tor intended to name bank E as successor to bank A was
brusquely pushed aside, and rightly, it is believed. Certainly
so on the application of a mechanical technique, for at the time
the will was executed, bank A had ceased to exist. From the
factual standpoint, too, the decision is desirable. It strains one's
credulity to believe that necessarily the testator would have ap-
pointed bank E, in view of the far-reaching changes in per-
sonnel, policy, and increase or decrease in assets and liabilities
resulting from the several combinations. It must be remem-
bered, however, that the courts have not openly expressed their
concern with these factors. 46 It is to be hoped that the future
will mark a change in their attitude.
IV. STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS
A. Quantity of the Modification.
With the exception of eleven jurisdictions, 47 legislatures
have made attempts, with varying degrees of completeness, to
provide for the succession of corporate fiduciaries. It may be
more than mere coincidence that of the eleven, only two are
1932), involving two sales, a conversion and a consolidation.
Bank A received letters testamentary as executor of testator's will.
Thereafter, bank A was sold to bank B, which consolidated with bank
C, forming bank D. The latter was then sold to bank E which reorgan-
ized, becoming NationaZ bank F. While this was going on accounts
in this estate were duly filed, including two by bank F. Objection to
the last account was made on the ground that bank F didn't succeed
to office of executor to which bank A had been appointed. Held: Bank
F succeeded to the office of executor.415 Matter of Wolbert, 144 Misc. 328, July 19, 1932.
46 Cf- Matter of Stikeman, supra, note 4.4
1 Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Texas. Also
District of Columbia.
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eastern states, with honors as to the remaining eight jurisdic-
tions equally divided between the south and west. It has been
pointed out 48 that the development of the corporate fiduciary, in
a given area, is closely related to the economic set-up of that par-
ticular territory. The frequency of wealth accumulations breeds
the trustee.4 9 Only comparatively recently have large fortunes
occurred with any great frequency in the south and west. It is
not difficult to see that the problem of succession is of little im-
portance in communities where trust business is slight and trust
companies few. Absence of statutory provisions is not sur-
prising.
B. Quality of the Modification.
The fact that thirty-seven states have statutes relating to
the succession of corporate fiduciaries does not mean that the
question is a closed one in those jurisdictions. At least ten of
these make no reference in terms to fiduciariesP0 or succession ;5-1
and even those statutes which are most comprehensive from a
mechanical point of view omit provisions which are to be de-
sired. The table below gives an analysis of the statutes under
five headings52 viz.: 1) Does the particular statute apply to all
banks, state and national? 2) Does the statute apply both to
merger and consolidation, or only to one of them? 3) Does the
statute allow the succession, no matter what kind of instrument
creates the fiduciary relationship? 4) Does the statute allow
the succession? a) When the consolidation and/or merger oc-
curs subsequent to the actual vesting of the fiduciary relation-
ship in the bank participating in the consolidation and/or
48See T. G. Smith, Trust Companies in the United States (1928),343-5.
"Powell, Cases & Materials on Trusts & Estates, Vol. I, ch. 2, foot-
note 36 (1932).
"The Illinois Statute is representative of this group. Ill. Rev. St.
(Cahill 1931), c. 32, paragraph 70. "Such single corporations (after
merger or consolidation: Ed.) shall thereafter possess all the rights,
powers, privileges and franchises, and all property, real, personal or
mixed . . . belonging to each of such corporations and subject to
all the restrictions liabilities and duties of each such corporation so
merged or consolidated. All property, rights, privileges, powers and
franchises and all and every other interest shall thereafter be as
effectually the property of the single corporation as they were of the
several and respective merging or respective corporations."
"
1Supra, note 50. See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Zinser, supra,
note 16.52See appendix for chart of the statutes.
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
merger? b) When it occurs subsequent to the designation as
fiduciary but prior to the actual vesting of the relationship, e. g.,
where the consolidation and/or merger occurs during the life
of a testator who has designated one of the participating banks
as fiduciary? c) When the consolidation and/or merger occurs
prior to the designation? 53 5) Does the statute apply to ex-
ecutors, administrators and trustee, or only to some 7
In the states53A where the only referable statute is in the
general corporation law, a two-fold mechanical approach is
open, viz.: 1) that of the Mueller case54 or 2) that of the
Massachusetts courts. 55  On a purely technical basis, it is be-
lieved that the view that a mere designation as fiduciary is not
a property right is sounder.56 Of the remaining states only
two5" have evinced any semblance of interest in criteria for the
determination of succession which have regard to the interest
of the other parties involved. South Carolina's statute allows
succession where state banks only are involved, on the occur-
rence of two conditions precedent: 1) the consent of the origi-
nally-designated bank; 2) the approval of the court.5 s Wash-
ington is more explicit. 59
It was noted above that only one case had been found where
the designation was made after the named bank's existence had
been destroyed by merger.6 0 No reference was there made to
the New York statute61 but it is doubtful whether aid would be
forthcoming from that source because the statute provides ex-
'Cf. Matter of Wolbert, supra, note 45.
3ADelaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah.
" Supra, note 41.
51 Supra, note 23.
"Supra, pp. 2-3; supra, pp. 5-6.
5 South Carolina and Washington.
58South Carolina. Laws of 1928. No. 693, Sec. 10.
"Washington Laws 1931, c. 126, Sec. 9. ". . . . Provided that
nothing shall be construed as requiring any court to confirm such con-
solidated bank in any office, appointment or trust, or as preventing
any court from removing such consolidated bank from any office, ap-
pointment or trust to which it has succeeded by virtue of such con-
solidation, if such court shall deem such consolidated bank incapable
of or disqualified from exercising such office, appointment of trust,
or that its appointment to, or continuance in such office, appointment
or trust would not be for the best interest of the estate, interest or
trust to which such office, appointment or trust pertains."
6*Matter of Wolbert, supra, note 45.
61 N. Y. Laws, 1930, c. 407, amending N. Y. Banking Law (Consol.).
Laws 1917, c. 2, Sec. 737, adding Secs. 225, 226.
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pressly for every contingency but that one. Only two statutes
have been found which in terms cover such a situation.6 2
In all but one63 statute technical loopholes might possibly
be found under one of the five headings outlined above. A
goodly number of the statutes use only "consolidation. "6" Do
they employ it strictly according to its definition ?5 If they do,
are mergers definitely excluded from the application of the
statute? If the word is used to describe a merger, will that
necessarily prevent a consolidation from coming under the
statute? The McFadden Act 66 is a good example of the loose
terminology employed by legislators. "Consolidation" is the
word used throughout. Nevertheless it is believed, from a
perusal of the surrounding text,6 7 that "merger" was meant.
The courts have unwittingly carried on the comedy of errors
by allowing mergers68 to come within the ambit of the statute,
without, however, excluding true consolidation.6 9 The use of
words having definite connotations which express a meaning dif-
ferent from that intended to be conveyed can only lead to con-
fusion. Some states,7 0 unfortunately few, have taken care to
make the distinction. Ambiguity of terminology is a too fre-
quent fault. More expert draftsmanship is the easy solution.
Almost half of the thirty-seven statutes have no provision
' Michigan: Compiled Laws 1929, § 12026: "the consolidated
corporation . . . shall hold, exercise, and perform all rights,
powers, privileges, duties and obligations appertaining to any and all
trusts, representative or fiduciary relationship whatsoever as to, or
for which, either or any one of the corporations so consolidating may
have been appointed, nominated or designated by any will or convey-
ance or otherwise. Whether or not such will, conveyance, or other act
intended to create such trust, representative or fiduciary relationship
shall have been executed or have come into or taken effect at the time
of such consolidation." Oregon Laws (1931), c. 278, § 36: "the suc-
cessor corporation shall succeed to the appointment of all executor-
ships, trusteeships . . . and other fiduciary capacities in which
the former corporation may be then or thereafter named in wills there-
tofore or thereafter probated on in any other instruments."
"West Virginia Code (1931), 31.8-29.
"Supra, note 52.
6 Supra, pages 2-3.
' Supra, note 30.
"' Note especially the words "into which it is consolidated", Supra
n. 30.
61 Worcester County Nat. Bank, Petitioner, supra, n. 33. Stevens v.
First Nat. Bank and Co., supra n. 36.
Hofheimer Exr. v. Seaboard Citizens' Nat. Bank, supra n. 39.
"Cf. Georgia: Park's Annotated Code (1914) § 2274 (e), (f);
Maine: Revised Statutes (1930), c. 56, § 63.
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relating either to the consolidation or merger of a state with/into
a national bank. Does that mean that the state bank must re-
organize into a national bank before it may consolidate with or
merge into another national bank? A large part of the diffi-
culty is obviated by the MKcFadden Act, but the limitations to
and the loopholes in the federal statute are too great to permit
us to be content with its workings.
V. SUGGESTION AS TO FUTURE ACTION, STATUTORY
AND JUDIOIAU
It is noticeable, in the relatively few decided cases, that the
approach of the courts has been by way of a strictly mechani-
cal, syllogistic technique. That is to say, the problem as to
whether a given corporation should succeed to a fiduciary rela-
tionship is solved by answering one or two barren questions and
glossing over sometimes-justifiable objections. Is the bank seek-
ing the succession "the same bank" named in the creating in-
strument? If not, no succession; if so, then succession allowed.
It is submitted however, that the courts, and the legislatures
too, in arriving at their conclusions, slide over an important im-
plication raised by the words "the same bank." What criteria
are to be used in deciding the meaning of those words? Shall
the name of the new bank be decisive? The absurdity of the
query is its own sufficient answer. Is the successor corporation
the same legal entity as the institution originally named?
Clearly not in the case of consolidation.7 1 Likewise not where
the designated bank is the one absorbed in a merger. But just
as clearly the absorbing bank in a merger is no different, in the
eyes of the law, from what it was prior to the merger. Should
such a bank, where it has already been named as fiduciary, con-
tinue to act as such? There has been no hesitation on the part
of the courts in giving an affirmative answer. 72  It is believed
that hesitation here is desirable. The change or continuation of
the legal entity may or may not bring with it differences of a
more significant nature. It is entirely conceivable that a sub-
stitution of legal entities will involve a change in personnel, or
a difference in policy, or a dissimilarity in limitations on the in-
"'Supra, pp. 2-3.
72.Spra, n. 32.
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vestment of trust funds. All or any of these factors may -have
been the prime considerations in the choice of a fiduciary. To
allow the chosen corporation carte blanche, as provisions for
automatic successors do allow, may well mean the creation of a
Frankenstein which will ultimately destroy the maker. Spe-
cifically, there occurs to the mind the situation where the "des-
ignator," after thorough investigation, chooses as his trustee an
institution with a well-deserved reputation for conservatism
and stability. Subsequently the chosen bank may do a number
of things: e. g. 1) it may absorb a financially weak bank in a
merger, thus weakening its own position without a change of
legal exterior; 2) it may become absorbed by a financially weak
bank, its own legal existence ended; 3) it may consolidate with
one or more banks to save the latter from going on the rocks,
the resulting institution being a solvent, although probably
weaker corporation. It does not unduly strain one's credulity
to see that very possibly the risk of loss of trust funds may be
increased and the chances of foisting an undesired executor or
administrator on the estate enlarged. The rebuttal of the courts
that the testator or settlor is presumed to intend the results
which the operation of the statutes produce seems factually
without basis when the results are adverse to his, the estate's
or the beneficiary's interests. Nor, as has been seen, is it sound
to say that the designation as fiduciary in an ambulatory docu-
ment is such a property interest as passes on merger or con-
solidation. It may be technically defensible to so hold where
the fiduciary relation has "vested," but it is thought that such
a wooden ground should be of trifling importance. The bank
originally designated may have been chosen because of the great
degree of personal control characterizing the administration of
its trust department. To the inherent limitations of a corporate
trustee73 may be added the possibility that the successor corpora-
3 Fulton, Advantaqes and Limitations of Corporate Trwstees, 34 L.
Q. Rev. 304 (1918). "In the case of the corporate trustee . . . frequent
changes must take place in the personnel of the 'trustee' and the
greater the expansion of business, the more frequent will be the
changes . . . The new trustee must rely. not upon his own knowledge
derived from a personal contact with the beneficiaries . . . or ... the
settlor or the retiring trustee, but from such information as he can
glean from the file of papers connected with the case ... he will still,
for a time at any rate, lack that confidence which he would have had
oad he dealt with the case throughout, and the same results will follow
on each successive change."
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tion will have a large trust department necessitating lessened
personal contact by an entirely different personnel. It is just
as possible, however, that the substitution or continuation men-
tioned above will not involve such important differences. At
any rate, it is believed that these considerations are important
and should be the factors leading the courts to make their deci-
sions one way or the other. Nor have the legislatures been free
from the same cbarge. Only two statutes have shown any indi-
cation that other than mechanical, orthodox criteria shall pre-
vail.74 It is submitted that in amending old and drafting new
statutes, consideration should be given to two factors. Firstly
the mechanics of the succession problem should be carefully con-
sidered: Ambiguity of terminology, as to consolidation and
merger, to be avoided, and provision made for the statute's ap-
plication to every kind of creating instrument, to all banks,
state and national, to all kinds of fiduciaries and to all variations
of fact situations.7 5 Then room should be allowed for judicial
supervision, so that the court could take account of the factual
changes wrought by the consolidation or merger to decide
whether or not it would be desirable, in the light of those
changes, to allow the succession. Wooden formulae to the effect
that change of legal entity per se bars the succession, or that
the appointment to a fiduciary position is a property right which
passes to the successor corporation are barren criteria, which,
mechanically applied, must needs produce, at one time or an-
other, barren results. Litigants and bench alike ought not to be
lackadaisically tolerant of them. It is hoped they will not be.
74 Supra, note 58, 59.
1 S'upra, note 11.
APPENDX
LIST OF STATUTES
1. Alabama Laws (1931), Act No. 62, sec. 4.
2. California Statute (1929), c. 239, § 8, amending Stat. 1927, p.
1795, No. 31d of Banking Law.
3. Colorado Laws (1931), c. 54, §§ 1, 2, 3.
4. Connecticut General Statute (1930), § 3890, § 3993.
5. Delaware: Laws (1927), c. 85, § 19.
6. Florida General Laws (1927), § 6563.
7. Georgia: Park's Annotated Code (1914), § 2274 (e), (f), Ga.
Code Ann. (Mich. 1926), c. 2, art. 4, § 3883-4.
8. Idaho: Laws (1925), c. 133, art. 1, § 51.
9. Illinois Rev. Statute (Cahill 1931), c. 32, par. 70.
10. Indiana Laws (1931), c. 23, §§ 1, 2, 3.
11. Kansas Laws (1931), c. 84, §§ 1, 2; c. 87.
12. Kentucky: Statutes (1930), § 603a-1.
13. Maine: Revised Statute (1930), c. 56, § 63.
14. Maryland: Bagby's Annotated Code (1924), § 59, as amended
by Laws (1931), c. 294, § 8.
15. Massachusetts General Laws (1921), c. 172, § 44, as amended
by Laws (1931), c. 12.
16. Michigan: Compiled Laws (1929), § 12026.
17. Minnesota: Statute (1931),, § 7699-99% as amending Minn.
Stat. (1927), § 7699-5 and § 7699-9.
18. Missouri: Rev. Statute (1929), § 5490.
19. Montana: Laws (1931), c. 108, amending Laws (1927), c. 89,
§ 94.
20. Nevada: Compiled Laws (1929), § 1737.
21. New Jersey Laws (1928), c. 20, § 1.
22. New Mexico: Statute (1929), § 32-216.
23. New York Laws (1930), c. 407 amending New York Banking
Law (Consol. Laws 1917, c. 2), § 137, adding sees. 225, 226.
24. North Carolina Code (1931), § 217.
25. North Dakota Laws (1931), c. 95, § 2 amending Session Laws
of North Dakota (1927), c. 108.
26. Ohio General Code (1932), § 10506-57 (114 Ohio Laws p. 376).
27. Oregon Laws (1931), c. 278, § 36.
28. Pennsylvania 7 P. S. (1931) (Banks & Banking), §§ 392, 393, 412.
29. South Carolina Compiled Laws (1929)-Laws 1928, § 693, § 10,
Acts of 1930, §805, § 1.
30. Tennessee Laws (1931), c. 29, § 2.
31. Utah: Compiled Laws (1917), § 888, as amended by Laws (1921),
c. 22.
32. Vermont: Laws (1919), § 125.
33. Virginia Code (1930), § 4149-10.
34. Washington Laws (1931), c. 126, §§ 8, 9.
35. West Virginia Code (1931), 31-8-29.
36. Wyoming Laws (1931), c. 91.










.o, aJ~1" a o/pu ~ . I
.. -" ",- - -- -- --- --
d o uTwP!OsuO °'°/o ! '
• O~t~qu ~ ~ ac" "a a
0~v UteOf U4DC) ON
eU!i'r, e0 ** *C •
Zx Orpu1S! ON
O il017au. ON __
*2_______ .--- ---- [----- ==--=
aalsna.,2 ui, uoddV
0 II K ON
-=4 - - --------- -- --.-.-. -
puT I[V "• ** *
o. u'tax~q .io
O. . . . .. ..... .
o2 zeoe . o] opux * ** ,a ** • •c
o2 = uofl.pfiosuo3
UOca LO 0 c
- -- - , _, - -. ...-- - - -
Sul -~iA
e:.1tox .1
" Ai-u[O * - a I** • • * * •
o-C 
a.el'oe
pu IIV *** * * a
Sg2UT ZW *eja *op


















, Q'D 02 *
- -* - - - J C




- -- - - - c
ba0
0 0 d0
C4 a) C3 4
'o ~ ~ 0 N 0
